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IGNORANCE AND PROCEDURAL LAW REFORM:
A CALL FOR A MORATORIUM
Stephen B. Burbank'
In

1881,

Oliver

Wendell

Holmes,

Jr.

observed

that

"(i]gnorance is the best of law reformers. People are glad to
discuss a question on general principles, when they have
forgotten

the

reasoning."1

special
1982,

In

knowledge
I

necessary

concluded

a

study

for
of

technical
the

Rules

Enabling Act of 19342 with a question for federal rulemakers,
namely, whether "ignorance can continue to be 'the best of law
reformers."'3

My

question

was

prompted

by

the

studied

indifference of those responsible for the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure

to

questions

of

rulemaking

power.

In

the

intervening decade, I also have had occasion to lament their
studied

indifference

to

empirical

questions.4

The

two

phenomena are related. The papers for this session provide a
welcome occasion to explore that relationship, however briefly.
I want to suggest that by failing to take seriously the task
of defining limitations on the rulemaking power, the Supreme
Court and those who assist it have encouraged Congress also
to

ignore

the

question

Similarly,

by

failing

operation

of

the

rulemakers

to

Rules

have both

of

appropriate

seek
or

put

empirical
proposed

their

allocation
evidence

rules.
on

the

amendments,

the

workproduct

at

risk

of

Robert G. Fuller, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law
School. This article is a revised version of remarks made at the Symposium. I
have profited from discussions with Leo Levin and Richard Marcus.
1 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 64 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., 1963).
2 Act of June 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064. The current version
of the Enabling Act is contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1988) (bankruptcy rules).
3 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1015, 1197 (1982) (footnote omitted).
4 See,
e. g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28, 1934-41,
1957-59 (1989).
·
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legislative override and encouraged Congress to initiate its
own half-baked reforms. We need a moratorium on procedural
law reform, whether by court rule or by statute, until such
time as we know what we are doing. The knowledge needed
concerns alternative reform strategies and their likely impacts,
but we also need to know who is responsible for what.
If this sounds like crisis rhetoric, which Professor Marcus
correctly suggests can be overblown, self-serving or both,5 so
be it. It is difficult, however, not to sense a crisis in federal
procedural reform when the Chief Justice's letter transmitting
the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules disclaimed any
implication "that the Court itself would have proposed these
amendments in the form submitted,''6 and when four other
Justices indicated their agnosticism about,7 lack of competence
evaluate8

to

or

disagreement

with,9

one or

more

of

the

amendments. When a majority of the Supreme Court has
washed its hands of proposed Federal Rules, and when some of
the Justices have aired the dirty linen, what is it that should
restrain Congress from responding to those who wish to do the
same?
It cannot be Congress' confidence that those who draft the
Rules are alert to the limitations on the rulemaking power
contained in the Enabling Act. Ignorance on that score has
persisted despite a serious effort to invigorate and clarify the
desired scheme of allocation in the legislative history of the
1988 overhaul of the Enabling Act.10 To be sure, there has

5

See

Richard

L.

Marcus,

Of Babies

and

Bathwater:

The

Prospects

for

Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 761 (1993).
6 H.R Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993) (letter from William H.
Rehnquist to Thomas S. Foley (April 22, 1993)), reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface)
477 (1993).
7 See H.R Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 102 (statement of Justice White),
reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 575.
8 See H.R
Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 101-02, reprinted in 113 S. Ct.
(Preface) at 581.
9 See H.R Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 104 (dissenting statement of Justice
Scalia), reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 581. Justice Scalia dissented from the
Court's adoption of amendments to Rule 11 (sanctions) and to Rules 26, 30, 31, 33
and 37 (discovery). Justice Thomas joined in full, while Justice Souter joined in
the dissent with respect to the discovery rules.
10
See H.R REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985); Stephen B. Burbank,

Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and "Procedure" in
the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1029-36; Karen Nelson Moore, The
Supreme Court's Role in Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

44
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been progress, including one Reporter's acknowledgement that
separation

of

powers

is

an

Enabling

Act

concern, 11

the

Supreme Court's willingness, for the first time since Sibbach
Co.,12

Wilson &

to

take at

least

somewhat

seriously

v.

an

Enabling Act challenge to a Federal Rule (Rule 11)/3 the
Court's refusal to transmit proposed amendments because of
foreign refations concerns14 and the acknowledgement by the
Advisory Committee that one of its proposals may transgress
the Enabling Act's limitations.15 There is still no consensus
among the rulemakers, however, about the nature and scope of
the limitations on their power. In the absence of consensus, the
Advisory Committee is apt to equate controversy with politics,
which is for Congress,16 and the statement of controversial
issues that the Supreme Court now expects to receive with
rulemaking proposals17 is apt to tempt Justices to "discuss a

HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1043-53 (1993).
11

See Burbank, supra note 10, at 1015, 1017 n.31, 1018-19; Paul D.
Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE

L.J. 281, 298.
12
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
13 See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Comm'n Enter.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 533
(1993). But see Ralph U. Whitten, Developments in the Erie Doctrine: 1991, 40 AM.
J. COMP. L. 967, 967-70 (1992). "It remains true that the Court has never
invalidated a rule promulgated under the Act." Id. at 970.
14 See H.R
Doc. No. 77, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1991) (letter from William
H. Rehnquist to Thomas S. Foley (April 30, 1991)); Letter from William K. Suter,
Clerk of the Supreme Court, to L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary of the Judicial
Conference of the United States (Dec. 11, 1991) (returning proposed amendments
to Rules 4, 4.1, 12, 26, 28, 30, and 71A and enclosing documents presenting
foreign relations concerns).
15 The Advisory Committee Note to the 1993 amendments to Rule 4 is prefaced
by a "Special Note" as follows: "Mindful of the constraints of the Rules Enabling
Act, the Committee calls the attention of the Supreme Court and Congress to the
new subdivision (k)(2). Should this limited extension of service be disapproved, the
Committee nevertheless recommends adoption of the balance of the rule . . . "
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 154-55, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at
631.
6
1
See Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Minutes of
Committee Meeting 4-5 (April 13-15, 1992) [hereinafter April 1992 Minutes].
"Unless there is consensus about the limits of the rulemaking function, however, it
is doubtful that all the procedural safeguards in the world will prevent controversy
where it counts-in Congress-because the rulemakers' reaction to controversy in
the lawmaking process will necessarily continue to be ad hoc." Burbank, supra
note 3, at 1195.
17 The Advisory Committee
was informed in February 1992 "that the Court
would in the future like a memorandum explaining the contentious issues
resolved." Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of Committee Meeting
.
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question on general principles [even] when they [acknowledge
that they] have forgotten the knowledge necessary for technical
reasoning."18
Perhaps, however, Congress should stay its hand because,
although

the

rulemakers

have

no

shared

sense

of

the

limitations on their power, in Professor Marcus' words, they
approach innovations with "neutrality and care."19 Is that how
anyone else would describe the process that yielded the two
most notorious Rules in the last decade, Rule 11 as amended
in 1983 and Rule 26 as amended in 1993?
First, as to care, amended Rule 11 was promulgated in a
virtual empirical vacuum,20 but with numerous warnings from
the bar about its potential costs.21 I applaud the rulemakers'
willingness to consider and propose additional amendments
and to seek empirical evidence in the process, but they did not
exactly volunteer.22 Moreover, this irresponsible experiment
with court access23 was in place for ten years.

1 (February 21, 1992) [hereinafter February 1992 Minutes). Appendix H to the
Judicial Conference Rules materials for September 1992 is a document entitled
Proposed Rules Amendments Generating Substantial Controversy.
18

See HOLMES, supra note 1, at 64.
Never having specialized in trial practice, I began at the level of
expertise (and of acquiescence in others' proposals) with which Justice
Douglas ended. Both categories of revision on which I remark today,
however, seem to me not matters of expert detail, but rise to the level of
principle and purpose that even Justice Douglas in his later years
continued to address.
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 110, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 587.
19 Marcus, supra note 5, at 805.
20 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1927-28.
21
See id. at 1955.
22Rule 11 was discussed again. It was noted that the anger level in the
bar is high. It was again noted that the criticism is impressionistic. It
was also observed that the furor is different than that bearing on Rule
23 in 1966 with respect to the number and identity of persons involved.
It was also urged that the Committee should strive to be sufficiently
receptive to the concerns of others that people will not generally think it
necessary or desirable to go to Congress for help.
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Committee Minutes 53-54 (April 27-29,
1989).
23 "Theory is an irresponsible basis for lawmaking about something as
important as access to court, and it is especially irresponsible when the lawmaking
involves judicial amendment of a Rule that, in part because of access concerns,
only barely escaped the bright light of the democratic process." Burbank, supra
note 4, at 1947-48; see also id. at 1962.

\
I
1
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And what of the provisions for "required disclosures" in
the 1993 amendments to Rule 26?24 Do they demonstrate the
Advisory Committee's "care?'' Again, there was little relevant
empirical evidence25 and, indeed, the Committee repeatedly
rejected pleas to stay its hand pending the evaluation of
experience

under

local

rules.26

Having

once

abandoned

ship/7 the Committee was apparently persuaded to reboard
by the view that it "had a duty to provide leadership in light of
its study and hearings,"28 by expressed doubt that ongoing
experimentation would yield any useful empirical data29 and
by the argument that a national rule would be necessary to
effect "the cultural change the Committee sought."30 What the

24

See H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 28, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface)
at 680.
25
The Advisory Committee Note states:
The rule is based upon the experience of district courts that have
required disclosure of some of this information through local rules, court
approved standard interrogatories, and standing orders
. While far
more limited, the experience of the few state and federal courts that
have required pre-discovery exchange of core information .
. indicates
that savings in time and expense can be achieved
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 94, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 702.
Yet, the information considered by the Committee was essentially anecdotal,
and it was not extensive. See, e. g., Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules,
Minutes of the Committee Meeting 5, 8 (November 17-18, 1989); Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of the Committee Meeting 2 (Nov. 29-Dec.
1, 1990); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 810-20, 821 (1991).
26
See Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Minutes of the Committee
Meeting 1 (May 22-24, 1991); April 1992 Minutes, supra note 16, at 7; Mullenix,
supra note 25, at 816-17 n.114; Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for
Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455, 458-59 (1993); see also
infra note 30.
27 See February 1992 Minutes, supra note 17, at 4.
28
April 1992 Minutes, supra note 16, at 7.
29
30

See id.

!d. The Committee agreed, however, that "the national plan [should] be
subject to local variation." !d. Thus, amended Rule 26(a)(1) begins: "Except to the
extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall,
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties
. ." H.R. Doc.
No. 74, supra note 6, at 203, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 680. Professor
Stempel asserts that this feature of Rule 26(a)(1) "reduc[es] the force of th[e]
objection," made by Justice Scalia, that "[a]ny major reform of the discovery rules
should await completion of the pilot programs authorized by Congress." H.R. Doc.
No. 74, supra note 6, at 109, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 586. Yet, local
variation under the Rule requires that "a court act[ ] affirmatively to impose other
requirements or indeed to reject all such requirements for the present," H.R. Doc.
NO. 74, supra note 6, at 226, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at 702, and the
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Committee's "study" involved, other than thought experiments
by judges and

law

professors

and

consideration

of

some

anecdotal experiences,31 and what light the hearings shed to
dispel the massive opposition of the practicing bar32 are not
clear. Moreover, one would have thought both that care in
drafting should produce an easily comprehensible rule and that
a vehicle of cultural change should not be riddled with escape
hatches.33
Second, as to neutrality, Professor Marcus and I are in
substantial

agreement,

which

is

to

say

that

from

my

perspective he is dealing with a number of straw men (and
women). We both know the difference between the inevitable
non-neutrality of procedure and the notion that the rulemakers
are or might as well be animated by an overtly political
agenda.34 We also know that no responsible scholar who has
seriously

considered

the

issue

of

non-trans-substantive

procedure proposes a revolutionary reform. The impact of the
critique is, indeed, "relatively modest."35 I agree with Professor
Marcus-indeed, I have been at pains to point oue6-that " [i]t
does

not

reject

the

general

idea of a

common

model

of

procedures for most or all cases, but only asks that special
circumstances be noted."37

Committee has provided little guidance for the exercise of the discretion conferred.
Neither that aspect nor the ability of the parties to stipulate out of Rule 26(a)(1)
bodes well for controlled experimentation. See Rhonda McMillon, ABA Seeks Delay
in Amending Federal Discovery Rules, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 119.
31 See supra note 25 and accompanying text. "Lawyers, including judges and
law professors, have been lazy about subjecting their hunches-which in honesty
we should admit are often little better than prejudices-to systematic empirical
testing." Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
366, 367 (1986),.
32 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 810.
33 See A. Leo Levin, Beyond Techniques of Case Management: The Challenge of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. (forthcoming 1993); see
also McMillon, supra note 30, at 119 (quoting report recommending ABA policy
that predicts adverse impact on CJRA experimentation process "as litigants and
courts struggle with the meaning and impact of the new national rules").
34 See, e. g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1472-73 (1987) (book review).
35 Marcus, supra note 5, at 778.
36 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 4, at 1940; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 693, 716-17 & n.172 (1988)
37 Marcus, supra note 5, at 778.
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Here, I think, is the rub. For although Professor Marcus
appears to agree that it makes sense to consider "the likely
effects of a change, including possible gains and losses for
identifiable groups,"38 and for a judgment to be made "whether
some adjustment in the general procedural regime should be
undertaken to ameliorate the impact on a particular area,"39
he does not tell us who should make that judgment and, if it is
the rulemakers, how they can possibly retain their neutrality.
Indeed, Professor Marcus' discussion of the "risks and costs"40
of substance-specific procedure demonstrates one reason why
the rulemakers so rarely seek facts bearing on the impact of
their proposals and why Professor Carrington advocated a "veil
of ignorance"41 in rulemaking.42
If neutrality is not to be a prescription for ignorance, the
rulemakers must have other sources of information about the
likely impact of proposed Federal Rules or amendments that
will serve as a surrogate for empirical work. Three possibilities
come to mind: the collective experience and wisdom of the
rulemakers, information provided through written comments
and public hearings and the fruits of scholarly inquiry. It
seems to me that the rulemakers' own knowledge base has
been shrinking, or should I say narrowing, that their professed
distaste for politics and unwillingness to share power have
consequentially diminished the utility of public comment and
that the nature of scholarship in the aid of legal reform has
changed depressingly little since the days when Charles Clark
was rewriting the Enabling Act as a scholar to suit his
purposes as a rulemaker.43
Professor Marcus is correct that the original Federal Rules
were drafted "by a group of elite lawyers and law professors
who

acted

with

little

empirical

evidence."44

They

were,

however, people of substantial practical experience45 concerned

38

Id. at 775.

39

Id.

40

ld. at 779.

41

Paul

Assertions:

D. Carrington,
An

Exorcism

Making

Rules

of the Bogy

of

to

Dispose

of

Manifestly

Non-Trans-Substantive

Unfounded

Rules

of

Civil

Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989).
42

See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1934-41.

43

See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1136-37, 1186.

44

Marcus, supra note 5, at 782.

45

See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal

1

j
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about rules that would work for lawyers and their clients while
serving what Professor Garth calls "the universal principles of
the profession."46 That seems to be the view Justice White
takes of the current rulemaking group or at least so one might
infer from his professed reluctance, as one long away from trial
practice

"to

second-guess

the

careful

work

of

the

active

professionals manning the rulemaking committees."47 Active
at

what

profession

and

serving

whose

interests?48

Does

neutrality include the willingness to subordinate the interests
of the judiciary narrowly viewed when they are in conflict with
other interests traditionally valued, including by the organized
bar?49 Is that the lesson of Rule 11, of sanctions in general, of
court-annexed arbitration or of managerial judging?50
Although

drafts

of

the

original

Federal

Rules

were

distributed for comment,51 in recent years the rulemaking

Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 971-72
(1987).
46 Bryant G. Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at
War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 959 (1993)
(identifying "the traditional legal values asserted by the organizations of the legal
profession-access, judicial independence, official public courts").
''7 H.R. Doc No. 74, supra note 6, at 101, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) at
575.
48 See Laura Kaster & Kenneth Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15 (noting small number of practicing lawyers on
Advisory Committee).
49 See Burbank, supra note 34, at 1476-83; cf. Burbank, supra note 3, at 1191
("But there is reason to fear that if the rulemakers are left to make choices in
such areas [between procedure and substance], and whatever the purpose of the
dichotomy, they will choose to advance those policies that are their special
province and to subordinate those that are not."). Of course, I agree with Professor
Walker that "federal courts are operated for the benefit of the parties and society
as a whole, not for the benefit of attorneys." Walker, supra note 26, at 478.
50 See Burbank,
supra note 34, at 1476-87. On managerial judging, see also
Marcus, supra note 5, at 790-94.
51 The original Advisory Committee
produced two preliminary drafts, one m 1936 and one in 1937.
Thousands of copies were printed. Everybody in the country had an
opportunity to examine them. At the suggestion of the Attorney General,
the Federal judges throughout the country appointed local committees of
the bar, which have worked on this problem. Thousands of suggestions
came to the advisory committee as a result of these two drafts.
Hearing

on S.J.

Judiciary, 75th
Paradigm,

Res. 281

Before

a Subcomm.

of

the Senate

Comm.

on

the

Cong., 3d Sess. 3-4 (1938). But see Jeffrey W. Stempel, New

Normal

Science,

or

Crumbling

Construct?

Trends

in

Adjudicatory

Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 667 (1993) (asserting

that

committee

"deliberated

in

relative anonymity

before

producing

a

fully

1

1

I
I

i

1993]

A CALL FOR A MORATORIUM

process

has

come

to

resemble

the

849

legislative

process.52

Professor Stempel believes that greater assimilation is called
for.53 I am not so sure.
The legislative process is, after all, an overtly political
process, and a visible participant in a political process may, as
Professor Chayes suggested of judges involved in public law
litigation, find it difficult to sustain her disinterestedness.54
The rulemakers' current strategies of burying their heads,
dismissing arguments with which they disagree as special
pleading or leaving it for Congress to second-guess them if it
chooses

to

do

so

on

"political"

grounds55

are

hardly

satisfactory. Yet, just as empirical data have been an effective
antidote to crisis rhetoric in recent years-as Professor Marcus
points out56-so could they provide a neutral counter to special
pleading in the future. Moreover, perhaps we should not give
up on the profession's ability to reassert the primacy of
"universal principles"57 over narrow practice interests. In any
event,

the

more

we

fashion

the

rulemaking

process

in

Congress' image, the more Congress will be tempted to second-

developed code of civil procedure").
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988); Stephen B. Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power,

11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 998-99 n.3 (1983); Mullenix, supra note 25, at 830-34.
53 See Stempel supra note 51, at 762. He also advocates more involvement by
the Supreme Court. Id. at That is hardly the Court's present inclination. See
supra text accompanying notes 6-9. Moreover, I am doubtful that the Justices have
either the time or expertise to make a useful contribution, and I fear that, except
when they are agnostic about a proposal, see supra text accompanying note 7, a
congressional veto entails some cost to the institution.
5"' "Can the disinterestedness of the judge be sustained, for example, when he
is more visibly a part of the political process? Will the consciously negotiated
character of the relief ultimately erode the sense that what is being applied is
law?" Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1309 (1976).
55 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rel uctant Partner: Making Procedural Law for
International Civil Litigation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1994). For
a recent example of some of these techniques from a member of the Advisory
Committee, see Ralph K. Winter, Foreword: In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58
BR OOK. L. REV. 263 (1992).
56 See Marcus, supra note 5, at
762.
Civil justice
issues
involve
value
choices-and that means political choices. But an enhanced knowledge base can
rescue us from a debate dominated by bogus questions and fictional facts." Marc
Galanter, News From Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U.
L. REV. 77, 102 (1993).
57 See supra text accompanying note 46.
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guess the product of that process or to preempt it.58 In other
words, I agree with Professor Marcus that "neutrality is at
least

a

pursuable

goal

in

designing

procedures

for

civil

litigation."59 The trick is to be candid in identifying policy
choices and clear about the allocation of power to make
them.60
As one whose work is cited twice in uncomfortably close
proximity to Professor Marcus' characterizations of criticisms
or commentary as "heated,"61 I should probably have better
sense

than

to

dilate

on

the

impoverishment

of

current

procedural scholarship. It is not a new story,62 which may be
answer enough to Professor Stempel's attempt to use civil
procedure textbooks as evidence of the vibrancy of the old
paradigm.63 Another look at those textbooks, however, should
suffice to drive from his mind the curious notion, at least as
applied to procedure, that "constitutional rights of federalism,
historically . . .

have

not

been

given

the

same

force

as

separation of powers principles."64 If that were true, Sibbach
v.

Wilson & Co. 65 and Hanna

v.

Plumer66 might have come

out the other way and we might not be here today.67
From this perspective, the teeth gnashing and general
hysteria that have greeted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
("CJRA")68 in some quarters are mystifying if not downright
funny. What is a member of Congress who hears that "[t] he
reigning sensibility for fifty years of federal rulemaking has
been an ethos of elitism and secrecy"69 to make of the charge
that

58

the

CJRA

was

"stealth

legislation"?70

If

that

same

Accord Walker, supra note 26, at 463.

59

Marcus, supra note 5, at 773.
0
6 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 34, at 1473.
1
6 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 776.
2
6 See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, J R., RESEARCH lN CIVIL PROCEDURE (1963).

63 See Stempel, supra note 51, at 688.
64 Id. at 415.
65 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
6
6 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
67 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 3, at 1028-35, 1187.
68

28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. III 1991).

69 Mullenix, supra note 25, at 837. But see supra note 51 and accompanying

text (noting wide distribution of drafts of original Federal Rules).
70 Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN.
L. R EV. 375, 397 (1992). The charge is, in any event, silly. See Jeffrey J. Peck,
"Users United:" The Ciuil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
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legislator knows something about the present composition of
the rules committees,71 how should she react to criticisms of
the Brookings Task Force,72 and why in any event should she
care since it did not enact anything?73 Should she be moved
by criticisms that the legislation is founded on a questionable
base74 if she knows the history of the 1993
amendments to Rule 26?75 Should she be moved by criticisms

empirical

that it will "transform the reigning procedural aesthetic of
simplicity and uniformity"76 if she knows that, as a result of a
vast underbrush of local rules and standing orders, the
supposed aesthetic has nothing to do with reality?77 And what
about the claim that the statute violates the separation of
powers?78 Is it Sibbach or Hanna that so exalts the allocation
of lawmaking power between the branches?79

105, 109, 116-17 (1991).
71 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
72 See Mullenix, supra note 70, at 406-07.
73 The same question might be asked about the advisory groups created under
the Act. See Levin, supra note 33; Stempel, supra note 51, at 733 ("A frequent
complaint voiced by practitioners serving on Advisory
Groups
is the
unreceptiveness of the bench to their ideas."). But see Linda S. Mullenix,
Unconstitutional

Rulemaking:

The

Ciuil Justice

Reform

Act and Separation

of

Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (1993) ("In delegating rulemaking power to

civilian, non-expert advisory groups, and in statutorily requiring that these
advisory groups consider and implement certain types of procedural reforms,
Congress engaged in procedural rulemaking."). More astonishing than this
assertion is Professor Mullenix's conclusion that Congress "violate[d] separation-of
power doctrine by impermissibly infringing on the power, prerogatives, and
independence of the federal courts to promulgate procedural rules." Id. For a more
sober judgment, see LAUREN K. ROBEL, FRACTURED PROCEDURE: THE CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT OF 1990 (forthcoming). See also infra text accompanying note 79.
7' See Mullenix, supra note 70, at 396-97 & n.90; Avern Cohn, A Judge's View
of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 101
(1991). Again, the same question might be asked about the work of advisory
groups under the Act. But see Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1287 ("under the Act,
grassroots, amateur local rulemaking groups will recommend problematic local
rules, measures, and programs based not on considered contemplative study, but
rather on ill-conceived social science, anecdote, and interest-group lobbying.").
75 See supra text accompanying notes 24-33.
76 Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1287.
77 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 1929, 1941. Professor Mullenix admits that
"[t]oday, federal practice and procedure is impossibly arcane." Mullenix, supra note
70, at 380.
78 See generally Mullenix, supra note 73.
79 "Congress
has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other federal
courts authority to make rules." Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 9 (1941)
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Please do not misapprehend. I am no fan of the CJRA or of
the process by which it was passed. In fact, I have found it
very difficult to read, let alone to take seriously. Professor
Robel's paper suggests that I have been on the right track,80
although some of the questionable local rules promulgated
under the CJRA's supposed authority, which she analyzes in
another paper, should be taken very seriously.81
Senator Eiden is not a captive of the insurance industry82
any more than he is the son of a Welsh coal miner.83 He is a
politician who wanted a statute on civil justice reform. After
some nervous moments, the end product was quite innocuous.
Against a background of the rulemaker's inattention to the
allocation of lawmaking power and to empirical evidence, many
criticisms of the CJRA from that quarter have the odor of sour
grapes.84

Moreover, to the extent that the Act as finally

passed is seen as an attempt to fill an empirical vacuum or an

(footnote omitted). "For the constitutional provision for a federal court system
(augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts." Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965). Professor Mullenix's attempt to deal with
these cases is based on a fundamentally flawed view of the Rules Enabling Act
and its antecedent history. See Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1327-29.
Indeed, the most astonishing aspect of her assault on the Civil Justice Reform
Act is the attempt to enlist the Rules Enabling Act in aid of her constitutional
thesis. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 73, at 1321-37. Senator Walsh, who
prevented passage of the legislation from 1915 until 1934, must be spinning in his
grave. See Burbank, supra note 3, at 1063-98. More important, the main sponsor
of the legislation, Senator Cummins, would be shocked. "It is probably true that,
in the absence of any legislation, courts have the inherent right to make rules for
the government of the matters mentioned in the bill: but this is purely an
academic question because the Congress has legislated upon the subject,
withdrawing that power, insofar as the district courts are concerned." 8. REP. No.
1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1926); see also id. at 7-9. On Cummins and the
importance of the 1926 Senate Report to the interpretation of the Enabling Act,
see Burbank, supra note 3, at 1071-92, 1098-1101; Peck, supra note 70, at 115.
Finally, all of us (including Professor Mullenix) should remember that the
Enabling Act was revised in 1988. See supra text accompanying note 10.
80
See Lauren K. Robel, Grass Roots Procedure: Local Advisory Groups and the
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 879 (1993).
81
See, e.g., ROBEL, supra note 73.
82
See Marcus, supra note 5, at 804. But see Cohn, supra note 74, at 103 ("it
appears that, given the financing of Justice for Ali, the precursor of the Eiden
Bill, the bill is being driven by special interests.").
83 See William Satire, On Language: No Heavy Lifting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27,
1987, § 6, at 12.
84 Cf. Robel, supra note 80, at 883 n.22 (quoting federal judge's remark, "Being
told you're inefficient by Congress is like being told you're ugly by a toad.").
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expression of distrust in the rulemaking process,85 Justice
Scalia's dissent can only flag the 1993 amendments to Rule 26
as salt in Senator Eiden's wounds.86
I am not sure that I agree with Professor Stempel's
prediction that "the judicial branch and the legal profession at
large will regain some of the ground lost."87 I am doubtful
because

practicing

lawyers

play

such

a

small

role

in

decisionmaking about the Federal Rules,88 and also because,
as Professor Garth suggests, it may no longer make sense to
talk about the legal profession in connection with procedural
reform.89 Indeed, it may be that the winners in the reforms of
the last decade have been the judiciary and some lawyers (and
their clients). If so, however, the lesson is not that neutrality
and

generality

unpredictable,

are

as

progressive

Professor

or

Marcus,

at

least

taking

benignly

a

cue

from

Professor Hazard,90 would have it.91
Whatever

the

motivations

of

the

original

Advisory

Committee,92 the procedural system that group produced was
a bonanza for lawyers-lawyers, it is important to note, of all
types. A system of open access to the courts is a lawyer
friendly system,93 one that permits lawyers, or at least those
who subordinate their clients' interests, not to worry about
what

Professor

Garth

contradiction-between

calls

the

"the

legal

tension-or

profession

and

even
legal

practice."94 And whatever accounts for the pressure to shrink
the litigation pie in recent years, the prospect has meant both
that it was more difficult for lawyers to subordinate their
clients' interests and that some lawyers (and their clients)
would lose. The choices about who wins and who loses typically
are not made in Federal Rules; they are made by judges

85

86

See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 5, at 852-53; Peck, supra note 70, at 113-16.

See H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 108-09, reprinted in 113 S. Ct.
(Preface) at 584-86; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
87 Stempel, supra note 51, at 735.
88
See supra text accompanying notes 44-50.
89 See generall y
Garth, supra note 46.
90 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2247 (1989).
91 See Marcus, supra note 5, at 773, 775, 785.
92 See id. at 765.
93 See generally Garth, supra note 46.
" Id. at 931.
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exercising the vast discretion that a system of general rules of
procedure reposes in them.95 Remember that Charles Clark
and William Howard Taft were dancing cheek-to-cheek.96
Divisions

among

lawyer

entrepreneurs

on

questions

relating to open access bode ill for the ability of the "organized
bar"97 to have consequential impact on civil justice reform,
wherever the focus of the reform effort. Worse, experience
under the CJRA suggests that, unless local experimentation is
tightly controlled, "various sections of the organized bar" may
collaborate with the federal judges who appoint them in what
Professor Robel calls the "destructi[on] of important procedural
values."98
These

phenomena-the

growing

impotence

of

the

organized bar, the increase in the number of difficult choices
federal judges must make in the exercise of their discretion
under the national rules and the temptation to make such
choices in local rules-are hardly a firm basis on which to
predict that Congress will, let alone to believe that it should,
leave the field.
Some years ago I half-facetiously asked whether, given the
assimilation

of

the

rulemaking

process

to

the

legislative

process and the pace of proposed amendments, there is "reason
to fear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will become a
latter day Throop Code."99 There would be nothing facetious
about such a question today, particularly with Justice Scalia
parting his veil of ignorance to assert that "[c]onstant reform of
the federal rules to correct emerging problems is essential."100
The

"continuous

study

of

the

operation

and

effect"101

of

Federal Rules required by statute need not be, and it should
not be, construed as an invitation to "[c]onstant reform." It is

95

See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 34, at 1473-76.

96

See Stephen B. Burbank, The Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 31, 33-34

(1988).
97 Garth, supra, note 46, at 932.
98 ROBEL, supra note 73.
99 Burbank,
supra note 52, at 999 n.3. "This Code ... was attacked by bar
committees for intermingling substantive and procedural provisions, and for being
too long, too complicated, 'too minute and technical, and lack[ing] elasticity and
adaptability."' Subrin, supra note 45, at 940 (footnote omitted).
100
H.R. Doc. No. 74, supra note 6, at 109-110, reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface)
at 586-87.
101
28 U.S.C. § 331 (1988).
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time for a breather, for a group that includes rulemakers,
members of Congress and members of the bar carefully to
review where we have been, where we are going and where we
should be going.102 It is time for a moratorium on ignorance
and procedural law reform.

102

The study group I have in mind, which might take the form of a national
commission, should consider the interesting proposal recently made by Professor
Walker, among others. See generally Walker, supra note 26.

